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Key points 
The Index-Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) product 
leverages the strong correlation between a remotely 
sensed vegetation index and livestock losses associated 
with forage shortages to offer insurance coverage to 
pastoralists in regions without access to conventional 
insurance products.  The IBLI product was first launched 
in January 2010 and is now available in several regions 
of northern Kenya and in the Borana region of southern 
Ethiopia. This brief draws together the findings from 
several longitudinal evaluations of the IBLI product in both 
countries. Important findings include:
•	 IBLI coverage has strong positive impacts on 
subjective, economic and health-related indicators of 
well-being. The gains are especially pronounced in the 
midst of drought events. 
•	 The marginal benefit/cost ratio of IBLI substantially 
exceeds that of unconditional cash transfers.
•	 These gains emerge despite IBLI’s imperfect coverage 
of purchaser’s risk exposure. The basis risk inherent 
to the product is considerable, with most of it due to 
inter-household heterogeneity and thus not amenable 
to reduction by tweaking the index design. 
•	 Uptake of the product has been significant, with more 
than 40% of sampled households purchasing IBLI at 
least once. Demand for IBLI responds significantly to 
price, liquidity, basis risk and spatiotemporal variation 
in expected herd losses. 
Introduction 
Livestock – the principal store of wealth and source of 
livelihoods for pastoralists in the arid and semi-arid lands 
(ASAL) of the Horn of Africa – face tremendous risk 
from frequent droughts. Livestock losses can be especially 
catastrophic due to the poverty that characterizes the 
system. Shocks can thrust prosperous households into 
chronic destitution. In much of the world, insurance is  
used to mitigate such shocks. Unfortunately, high costs 
imposed by actuarial data collection, adverse selection, 
monitoring for moral hazard and validating claims make 
conventional insurance policies unavailable in this isolated 
region. Instead, a stretched humanitarian response system 
has been the primary insurance against droughts.
Over the past decade, index insurance has generated 
excitement as a tool to extend access to formal insurance 
into environments that are inhospitable to conventional 
insurance, such as the ASAL. Index insurance bypasses 
many of the transaction costs associated with conventional 
insurance by basing policies on signals that are easy to 
observe and generally uninfluenced by individual action. 
In addition, index products typically use a single index, 
further reducing transaction costs. The tradeoff is that index 
insurance only covers covariate shocks – the average losses 
within a community – leaving some household-specific, 
idiosyncratic shocks uninsured. For index insurance to 
successfully mitigate the impact of drought shocks on the 
insured, the index must be highly correlated with covariate 
risk and covariate shocks must present a substantial risk.
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IBLI active and survey regions in Kenya and Ethiopia. 
IBLI was launched in Marsabit county of Kenya in January 
2010. Since then, it has been expanded to include Isiolo 
(August 2013), Wajir (August 2013), Garissa (January 2015) 
and Mandera (January 2015) in Kenya, and the Borana 
region of Ethiopia (July 2012).  The Government of Kenya 
is exploring taking a variant of IBLI nationwide under a 
proposed Kenya Livestock Insurance Program. 
IBLI contracts vary by region, but they are each 
developed to reflect deviations from historic averages 
of a remotely sensed and publicly available Normalized 
Differenced Vegetation Index (NDVI) measure of 
rangeland vegetation density.  As of this writing (April 
2015), 10,067 IBLI contracts have been sold and USD 
149,007 in indemnity payments have been made to 
insured pastoralists. 
The IBLI research team launched annual longitudinal 
household surveys in the Marsabit and Borana regions in 
order to monitor factors leading to IBLI uptake and to 
rigorously evaluate the impact of IBLI coverage on various 
indicators of well-being and behaviours. Both surveys 
include baselines collected before IBLI was available in 
the region.  The Marsabit survey started in 2009 and has 
been collected for five years, each with 924 households. 
The Borana survey, first collected in 2012, has now been 
collected from 515 households in four rounds. 
A set of randomized experiments was implemented 
among the surveyed households in order to learn about 
the impacts of price and product outreach on consumers’ 
understanding and uptake of the IBLI products. Price 
incentives, in the form of randomly distributed discount 
coupons that reduced premiums from 10-100% for the 
first 15 covered livestock units were distributed among 
surveyed households before each sales season. 
Randomized extension campaigns using a variety of 
games, videos, cartoons and radio broadcasts have 
also been implemented.  These experiments generate 
experimental variation in IBLI purchases that can be 
used to untangle the complex web of factors leading to 
purchasing insurance in order to let us isolate the causal 
effect of IBLI uptake on a variety of household behaviours 
and well-being indicators. 
Basis risk 
Index insurance policies make indemnity payments 
according to index readings, rather than actual losses 
experienced.  The indices are intended to reflect 
area-average losses, but necessarily do so with error. 
Heterogeneity between individuals within an index area can 
result in un-indemnified losses even if an index perfectly 
tracks average losses.  The differences between insurable 
losses and indemnity payments, called basis risk, is a chief 
weakness of index insurance. IBLI (in Marsabit) appears to 
be the first index insurance product to have its basis risk 
studied rigorously, because most index insurance studies 
lack adequate longitudinal household data. 
The basis risk faced by IBLI insured households is 
substantial. In Marsabit, IBLI covers only 62-77% of the 
herd mortality risk that households face.  The remaining 
basis risk is partially due to index error, or differences 
between predicted and area-average livestock mortality 
rates. A much larger portion of basis risk arises from 
between-household variation in livestock loss rates. Figure 
1 illustrates the high degree of heterogeneity between 
households across eight seasons in Central Marsabit. 
Figure 1. Household livestock mortality rates by season in the Central 
Marsabit region. 
Notes:  The distribution of household-specific losses within the Central Marsabit 
region for each season – from short rainy-short dry 2008 (SRSD08) to long 
rainy-long dry 2012 (LRLD12) – depicted by boxes for the interquartile ranges, 
with the upper and lower adjacent values are either 3/2 the interquartile range 
or the value furthest from the median. The remaining observations fall outside 
the adjacent values. The means are marked with an ‘X’.
At best, a perfect index product could mitigate risk 
associated with variation in the means across seasons. 
However, households insured with a perfect index product 
would continue to face the risk associated with variation 
around the means. 
Uptake 
Demand for IBLI followed a similar dynamic in the Borana 
and Marsabit areas. The initial launch and associated 
outreach was met with robust demand for the product. In 
the sales periods following the launch, there is a continued 
upward trend in cumulative adoption but there is also a 
substantial rate of disadoption (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. IBLI adoption and disadoption among surveyed households.
Notes: Cumulative adoption is the proportion of surveyed households that 
had ever purchased IBLI coverage by the end of the sales window. Cumulative 
disadoption is the number of households that purchased IBLI but then let the 
policy lapse by not purchasing further coverage in a subsequent season. The 
slight dip in disadoption seen in Marsabit is due to re-adoption, as households 
repurchase with a lag following a period without coverage.
Some disadoption is not surprising as households 
experiment with the product, especially if they do not 
receive indemnity payments early on that build their trust 
in the underwriter. Logistical complications have also likely 
dampened demand, for example, causing cancellation of the 
2nd and 5th Marsabit sales windows. 
In addition to implementation factors due to the delivery 
channel, household and policy characteristics play an 
important role in demand for IBLI. Similar to experiences 
in other index insurance pilots, household financial liquidity 
is positively correlated with demand, which is significantly, 
but in-elastically, related to price. Households in regions 
with greater basis risk are more responsive to prices. 
Although in this region livestock ownership is commonly 
concentrated in the hands of men, with women customarily 
responsible for milking herds and selling milk, there is no 
apparent gender difference in IBLI uptake. 
Households also exploit ecological signals when making 
purchase decisions, buying less coverage when they foresee 
good rangeland conditions and more when they anticipate 
a difficult season. Spatially, demand is greater where average 
risk, especially covariate risk, is greater. Those who have 
been educated about IBLI and grasp the concept of basis 
risk, are sensitive to higher rates of idiosyncratic losses. 
Production and welfare impacts 
In spite of the necessarily incomplete coverage IBLI offers 
against herd losses, it appears to benefit – or would benefit 
– most households in the ASAL regions studied across a 
range of different indicators. 
Even at the unsubsidized commercial premium rate, 
approximately equal to the actuarially fair rate with an 
additional 40% loading for firm overhead and profits, 
purchasing full IBLI coverage for all the seasons in the 
data costs, on average, the equivalent of 1.1% of herd size. 
In exchange, IBLI sharply improves the skewness of herd 
survival rates – increasing, on average, by 45.1% (from 
-1.185 to -0.651, t-stat=10.31) – by considerably reducing 
the risk of catastrophic losses. Simulations find that the 
improvement to skewness dominates, such that the 
majority of households are better off purchasing full IBLI 
coverage than choosing the no insurance alternative. 
In 2011, there was a catastrophic drought in the Horn of 
Africa. In Marsabit, IBLI coverage had significant effects 
on the coping strategies that households expected to use 
during the final months of the drought. Insured households 
were 36% less likely to anticipate relying on distress sales 
of livestock and 25% less likely to foresee reducing meals 
to cope with the drought. 
Looking across drought and non-drought years in Marsabit, 
households with IBLI coverage increase investments in 
livestock veterinary and vaccination services, and reduce 
herd size (most likely reflecting a reduction of precautionary 
savings in response to an insurance alternative). 
These and other changes to production strategies among 
the insured seem to pay off, increasing milk productivity 
of livestock and the total value of milk produced.  There 
is also a positive impact on other indicators of well-being, 
including greater household income per adult equivalent 
(AE) and improvements to mid-upper arm circumference 
(MUAC), a strong predictor of child malnutrition.
Even in the absence of severe drought or indemnity 
payments, IBLI seems to improve purchasers’ well-being 
by reducing their reliance on costly ex ante risk reducing 
strategies or just providing improved peace of mind about 
drought risk exposure. By March 2014, IBLI had been 
available in the Borana Zone for 24 months and had been 
sold during four different sales periods, but had yet to 
make an indemnity payment. IBLI purchasers nonetheless 
exhibit significant and meaningful improvements in 
subjective well-being. These positive effects of IBLI coverage 
are large enough to overcome an observed and statistically 
significant negative impact of buyer’s remorse due to having 
spent money on insurance that did not pay off and thus, in 
retrospect, was an unnecessary expense. 
A cost-effective social protection tool 
IBLI’s positive impacts do not, in themselves, justify investing 
scarce development or social protection funds in the 
design and delivery of index insurance products. One needs 
to have a sense of the opportunity cost of those funds; that 
is, how the expected benefit/cost ratio compares to other 
prospective interventions. 
To better understand the value of IBLI, its costs and impacts 
were compared with those of the Hunger Safety Net 
Program (HSNP), an ongoing unconditional, targeted cash 
transfer program launched by the government in northern 
Kenya in 2009. The overlapping spatial coverage and timing 
in the launch of HSNP and IBLI created an opportunity to 
design a comparative evaluation of the two approaches to 
investing in social protection in risky ASAL settings. 
Both IBLI coverage and HSNP participation increase 
household income from milk, income per AE and MUAC in 
children. By dividing the estimated local average treatment 
effects of each program by the total program cost born by 
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the public per client served, we find that the two programs 
are comparably cost effective at their current scale. But 
for scale up, the average treatment effect per marginal 
cost of an additional client is more relevant than the total 
program cost per client, which includes the fixed costs 
of establishing the product and its delivery channel(s). 
In terms of marginal benefits/costs, IBLI is an order of 
magnitude more cost effective, reflecting the relatively large 
sunk costs of developing and marketing a new product in 
what was previously a non-existent market and the very 
low marginal costs to government or donors of additional 
insurees who purchase the product from private providers.
Summary 
Index insurance shows considerable promise, especially in 
settings where conventional insurance to cover potentially 
catastrophic herd losses does not exist. However, index 
insurance products cannot practically provide complete 
risk coverage to policyholders and uptake of some index 
insurance products has been low, raising questions about 
their attractiveness, scalability and sustainability.  At the 
same time, development institutions and organizations 
have invested millions in developing and piloting new index 
insurance products because there are potentially large 
benefits from even modestly reducing risk for agricultural 
households in developing countries. 
Rigorous empirical analysis of the IBLI product in Ethiopia 
and Kenya and across multiple years provides convincing 
evidence that investments of this sort can have strong, 
positive impacts on well-being and these impacts per dollar 
are at least on par with those from cash transfer programs 
and, at the margin, can be considerably higher.  This work 
also illustrates that index insurance is not a single-shot 
solution to poverty and vulnerability to disasters. When 
designed well, index insurance products such as IBLI 
offer an important tool to help address uninsured risk 
exposure problems, especially in places where alternative 
risk management tools are costly and significant losses of 
livestock can cast households into poverty traps. 
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